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Abstract
This article discusses how the populist challenge can affect, directly or indirectly, the way the 
representative and liberal democracy works. Outside Latin America, Italy is one of the most typical 
cases of the populist challenge to liberalism. Indeed, in the General Election of spring 2018, the 
majority in the parliament was conquered by 2 populist groups: a) the Lega (17.35%); and b) the 
5-Star MoVement (MoVimento 5 Stelle [M5S]) (32.68%). The main assumption herein is that the 
populist ideology should be encompassed by the larger family of anti-liberal thought. At that 
level, the populist representation shares some common points with fascism. Although the idea 
of populist representation is quite different from that of fascism, both of them are based on 
anti-liberalism and they have an intrinsic tendency to plebiscitarianism. That is, their focus lies 
on 2 dimensions: a) the differences and continuities between the Lega and the M5S; and b) the 
role played by anti-liberal thought. The second dimension is related to the idea of representation 
and it is divided into 2 further layers: a) how the populists build their own audience; and b) the 
institutional reshuffle they propose to enforce the people’s will. 
Key words populism; anti-iberalism; Italy; Lega; M5S; plebiscitarianism.
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Introduction
Representation, according to the populist rationale and the way how the relationship between 
démos and power is established, is the core issue of this article. Thus, it discusses how the populist 
challenge can affect, directly and indirectly, the way the representative and liberal democracy works. 
That is, the focus lies on how the populists build their own audience and on the institutional reshuffle 
they propose to enforce the people’s will.
The primary assumption of populism is to establish a non-mediated link between the 
leader and the people and to tackle both the representative structure of democracy – that is, the 
intermediate bodies such as parties, trade unions, and so on – and the liberal one, providing people 
with ultimate legitimation to take part in every decision beyond the narrow rule of law paradigm. 
As explained by Nadia Urbinati (2014), representative democracy is based on a diarchic structure 
that separates will (the procedures and institutions) from opinion (the extra-institutional domain of 
political views).
Based on the assumption that reality is not objectively given (Ballacci, 2019), Pitkin (1967) 
argues that representation must be seen as a performative act, therefore, socially and historically 
constructed. Representation is a constitutive relationship that does not simply mirror pre-existing 
political identities, but it rather essentially contributes to create such identities (Disch, 2015). 
According to Michael Saward (2010), there are 3 crucial features involved in the representative 
process: a) the representation maker, in that case a politician; b) the representation maker’s message; 
and c) the audience. In this framework, the audience must be regarded as an active subject, since it 
could reject, amend, or accept the claim-maker’s message.
Populisme et pensée antilibérale: Lega et M5S dans le contexte italien 
Résumé
Cet article discute comment le défi populiste peut affecter, directement ou indirectement, le fonctionnement 
de la démocratie représentative et libérale. En dehors de l’Amérique Latine, l’Italie est l’un des cas les plus 
typiques de défi populiste au libéralisme. En effet, lors des Elections Générales du printemps 2018, la majorité 
au parlement a été conquise par 2 groupes populistes: a) la Lega (17,35%); et b) le MouVement 5 Etoiles 
(MoVimento 5 Stelle [M5S]) (32,68%). Ici, l’hypothèse principale est que l’idéologie populiste doit être englobée 
par la plus grande famille de la pensée antilibérale. À ce niveau, la représentation populiste partage certains 
points communs avec le fascisme. Bien que l’idée de représentation populiste soit très différente de celle du 
fascisme, les deux sont basées sur l’antilibéralisme et elles ont une tendance intrinsèque au plébiscitarisme. 
C’est-à-dire, son attention se concentre sur 2 dimensions: a) les différences et les continuités entre la Lega et 
le M5S; et b) le rôle joué par la pensée antilibérale. La deuxième dimension est liée à l’idée de représentation 
et elle est divisée en 2 couches supplémentaires: a) comment les populistes créent leur propre public; et b) le 
remaniement institutionnel qu’ils proposent pour faire triompher la volonté du peuple.
Mots-clés  populisme; antilibéralisme; Italie; Lega; M5S; plébiscitarisme.
Este artículo discute cómo el desafío populista puede afectar, directa o indirectamente, el funcionamiento de la 
democracia representativa y liberal. Fuera de América Latina, Italia es uno de los casos más típicos del desafío 
populista al liberalismo. De hecho, en las Elecciones Generales de primavera de 2018, la mayoría en el parlamento 
fue conquistada por 2 grupos populistas: a) la Lega (17,35%); y b) el MoVimiento 5 Estrellas (MoVimento 5 Stelle 
[M5S]) (32,68%). Aquí, la hipótesis principal es que la ideología populista debe estar abarcada por la familia 
más grande del pensamiento antiliberal. En este nivel, la representación populista comparte algunos puntos en 
común con el fascismo. Aunque la idea de la representación populista es bastante diferente de la del fascismo, 
ambas se basan en el antiliberalismo y tienen una tendencia intrínseca al plebiscitarismo. Es decir, su enfoque 
recae en 2 dimensiones: a) las diferencias y continuidades entre la Lega y el M5S; y b) el papel asumido por el 
pensamiento antiliberal. La segunda dimensión se relaciona con la idea de representación y se divide en otras 
2 capas: a) cómo los populistas crean su propio público; y b) la remodelación institucional que proponen para 
imponer la voluntad del pueblo.
Populismo y pensamiento antiliberal: Lega y M5S en el contexto italiano 
Resumen
Palabras clave  populismo; antiliberalismo; Italia; Lega; M5S; plebiscitarismo.
Populismo e pensamento antiliberal: Lega e M5S no contexto italiano 
Palavras-chave populismo; antiliberalismo; Itália; Lega; M5S; plebiscitarismo.
Este artigo discute como o desafio populista pode afetar, direta ou indiretamente, o funcionamento da 
democracia representativa e liberal. Fora da América Latina, a Itália é um dos casos mais típicos do desafio 
populista ao liberalismo. De fato, nas Eleições Gerais da primavera de 2018, a maioria no parlamento foi 
conquistada por 2 grupos populistas: a) a Lega (17,35%); e b) o MoVimento 5 Estrelas (MoVimento 5 Stelle 
[M5S]) (32,68%). Aqui, a principal hipótese é de que a ideologia populista deve ser abrangida pela família 
maior do pensamento antiliberal. Nesse nível, a representação populista compartilha alguns pontos em comum 
com o fascismo. Embora a ideia de representação populista seja bem diferente daquela do fascismo, ambas se 
baseiam no antiliberalismo e elas têm uma tendência intrínseca ao plebiscitarismo. Ou seja, seu foco recai sobre 
2 dimensões: a) as diferenças e continuidades entre a Lega e o M5S; e b) o papel assumido pelo pensamento 
antiliberal. A segunda dimensão se relaciona à ideia de representação e se divide em 2 outras camadas: a) 
como os populistas criam seu próprio público; e b) a remodelação institucional que eles propõem para impor 
a vontade do povo.
Resumo
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at the core of a populist approach, thus the relationship between démos and power should be 
established according the populist’s ideal pattern. 
Given the above, two questions emerge: 
•    How could a populist democracy be actually ruled? 
•     Which are, or which may be, the institutional characteristics of a populist regime?
At that level, the populist rationale represents a clear challenge to liberal representative 
democracy and, as Federico Finchelstein (2017) explains, since the defeat of fascism, populism is the 
only rhetoric allowed to escape from liberalism. Undoubtedly, the fascist’s and the populist’s answers 
to the crisis of liberal regime are quite different and they must not be confused, but they overlap 
somehow at least on one main point: the idea of people. Having the individual from the liberal 
perspective as a basis, in the populist and fascist view, the individual is replaced by the community, 
as a comprehensive and proto-totalitarian idea of the people. 
As a result, the rejection of mediated democracy must be translated into comprehensive 
representation in the case of fascism, by means of hyper-democracy in populism. Ideology and 
intellectualism arise, in both cases, as a way to manipulate the people’s will and then they are 
neglected by leaders. So, boundaries are not always easily distinguishable, but they exist. The very 
idea of populist representation is quite different from that of fascism, although they have another 
common point: an intrinsic tendency to plebiscitarianism (Urbinati, 2014).
Italy and the populist challenge
Outside Latin America, Italy is one of the most typical cases of the populist challenge to 
liberalism. In the General Election of spring 2018, the majority of the Italian parliament was conquered 
by 2 populist groups: a) the Lega (17.35%); and b) 5-Star MoVement (MoVimento 5 Stelle [M5S]) 
(32.68%). The weight of populist groups increased in the European elections: the Lega’s vote share 
rose from 17% to 34%. After the last Italian legislative election, held on March 4, 2018, the M5S joined 
the Salvini’s Lega to establish an alliance between the two main populist parties. Their negotiations 
took many weeks and the new Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, took office on June 1, 2018. Professor 
Paolo Savona, whose anti-Euro attitude was well-known, was included in one of the first cabinet 
members’ draft as the Minister of Economy. 
Having in mind the huge concerns about the European policy, which involve staying within 
the Euro Zone, the new cabinet strengthened the bonds between Italians and Germans immediately. 
After all, both parties took several anti-Euro actions (Adinolfi, 2016; Passarelli & Tuorto, 2018), so 
that appointment was interpreted as a consistent and clear intent to step out from the Euro Zone. 
Following pressures from the Head of the State, Sergio Mattarella, Savona has been replaced by 
Professor Giovanni Tria, who became the guarantor of compliance with the Euro Zone’s standards. 
The populist nature of the new government was widely assumed by the Prime Minister, who 
stated, on December 11, 2018: 
The relationship between the audience and the claim maker has deeply changed since the 
social media became an instrument for the impressive rise of populist movements. Their outstanding 
effectiveness has 2 main reasons: a) they make the message visible to a broad auditorium; and, even 
more important, b) they provide in-depth insight into audience reaction to the message, through 
multilevel analysis by age, sex, occupation, and so on. Nowadays, the social media constitute a 
prominent tool for devising further communication strategies, correcting mistakes, and gaining a 
better understanding of audience behavior.
However, as it seems clear, the message for the audience is straighter, i.e. without any opposing 
individuals, it is easier for the demagogue to persuade people. The social media’s revolution has 
certainly heavily hit the intermediate body and made the relationship between a society’s top and 
bottom seemingly closer. To a certain extent, we are not far from what has been described about 
the impact of social massification and the leader’s charismatic role towards the crowd in the seminal 
work by Gustave Le Bon (2013), firstly published in 1895. 
Nevertheles, populism is not just a demagogical rhetoric used by a charismatic leader to 
increase his audience, it is also an overarching framework to grasp the relationship between démos 
and power, in other words, it must also encompass the way how the rhetorical discourse is translated 
into a consistent institutional apparatus (Eatwell & Matthew, 2018; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; 
Urbinati, 2014).
Most of the literature on the theme focuses mainly on the former point i.e. discourse. Yet, to 
advance towards a better understanding of the populist phenomena as a whole, it is key to address 
the institutional framework herein.
Now, populism is the main challenge to stability in liberal democracies1 . But it is still hard 
to define exactly what populism is. The extensive literature on the subject is divided into several 
lines of interpretation. In political science, the twofold definition by Cas Mudde prevails: a revolt of 
the pure people against the elite(s) and thin ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Nevertheless, 
lack of ideology and anti-elitism are not enough or, to some extent, the right way to explain the 
populist phenomenon. Somehow, fascism has derived from the same misunderstanding, since it has 
been interpreted by Emilio Gentile (2005) as a form of ‘anti-ideological ideology’ promoting the 
primacy of action over theory, the victory of irrationality over reason. Particularly, it is hard to find 
a coherent concept of ideology in populism, given its multifaceted actual manifestations. In spite of 
the differences, any populist discourse has the people as its main source of legitimation. Thus, the 
twofold definition proposed by Carl Schmitt (2004) is closer to a meaningful interpretation. The 
contrast between people’s legitimacy and rule of law highlighted by the German constitutionalist 
must be resolved, so that the people’s legitimacy prevails over the rule of law. Hence, the main enemy 
of populism is not democracy per se, but liberal and representative democracy. Representation is 
1 As explained by Roger Eatwell, right-wing populism is a global phenomenon challenging liberal democracies: 
“Brexit and Trump actually followed the much longer rise of national populists across Europe, like Marine Le Pen in France, 
Matteo Salvini in Italy and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. They are part of a growing revolt against mainstream politics and liberal 
values” (Eatwell & Matthew, 2018, p. 169).
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On December 7, Salvini was elected the party’s Federal Secretary through primary election3, 
and just some months later, the LN suffered one of its greatest debacles in the 2014 European 
elections. Step by step, the new leader completely reorganized the LN’s structure, strategies, and 
thought. Its main goal was extending the party’s influence beyond the Po River. It was hard for the 
leader to overcome both the geographical and ideological constraints imposed by regional identity. 
The only way to achieve his goal was getting rid of internal opposition. The switching process 
from a regional to a nationalistic ideology and the conquest of Southern Italy were far from being 
unanimously accepted or definitively agreed4 . 
Although the new ideological roots became quickly clear, they are much more inconsistent 
now than in the past. Salvini has established close ties with the French National Front (Front National 
[FN]), led by Marine Le Pen, and made connections with the neo-fascist Italian movement CasaPound. 
In December 2014, a new group, Us with Salvini (Noi con Salvini [NcS]), a sort of LN’s southern 
brother, was created. Matteo Salvini became the leader of both parties and kept tight control over 
them. In 2016 and 2017, NcS participated in local elections, with very disappointing results. 
The foundation of a second party was a second step in the ongoing strategy. ‘League for 
Salvini Premier’ (Lega per Salvini Premier [LpSP]) was created through an official act published 
in Gazzetta Ufficiale (Lega per Salvini Premier [LpSP], 2017). The LpSP’s goal was to merge the 2 
different groups into a single party: the LN and the NcS. However, the LN and the LpSP still have 2 
parallel cadres with different statutes and, above all, 2 different memberships: a) in Northern Italy, 
the LN; and b) in the Southern Italy, the LpSP (Orengo & Del Dot, 2018). 
Therefore, Salvini has only partially reached his goal, although we must underline that, 
according to public opinion, the transformation process from a regional to a nationwide and 
nationalistic group has been successful. The results are striking. In 2018 Parliamentary Elections, 
LpSP won 18% of the votes (123 deputies), 17 of them from Southern Italy, and 58 Senator, 11 of them 
from Center-Southern Italy. The results of the 2019 European elections were even more impressive: 
LpSP won outstanding 34% of the votes and became the leading Italian party. 
Although it is not clear whether the Lega’s weak structure only obeys its leader, and the extent 
to which the party bodies’ mediation has been left out of the main decision-making processes, 
Salvini is just a step away from the premiership. No party congress has even ratified the change from 
the LN to the Lega. The nationalist ideology i.e. the rejection of regional autonomy/independence, is 
far from being accepted within the old party cadres. This gives rise to hidden conflict between the 
old militants and the new political elite brought by Salvini’s inner circle. 
3  It is worth noticing that one week earlier, on December 8, Matteo Renzi was elected General Secretary of the 
Democratic Party (Partito Democratico [PD]), through primary elections, too.
4 The claim for autonomy is still one of the main issues regarding the Lega’s governors in Northern Italy.
If populism is that form that allows the distance between the people and the elite 
to be reduced, giving them back their sovereignty, then we claim to be populists. 
However the distance between the two parties increased throughout the months and in 
August 2019 the alliance broke up. 
The M5S and the Lega arose in the aftermath of the deep legitimation crisis within the Italian 
party system following the 2008 economic crisis and Monti’s government, in 2011. Both parties2 
called for a less mediated democracy, i.e. exercised more directly. If, on the one hand, the M5S and 
the Lega share some common points regarding the institutional framework, on the other hand, they 
differ in how to reach that goal. 
The Lega’s case is extremely interesting, because the Lega and the Northern League (Lega 
Nord per l’Indipendenza della Padania [LN]) are not the same party, actually. The ‘Lega with Salvini’ 
is just a brand name that sprang up during the 2013 European elections, and it belongs to the Lega’s 
leader. By means of an unofficial process, Salvini turned a regional group into a national one and, 
paradoxically, nationalistic, too. There is herein a direct link between the people and the leader, i.e. 
without any party mediation.
The M5S’s case is quite different. Unlike the Lega, the M5S cornerstone is not the leader, but 
the people, expressing its will through several social networks, blogs, and since 2016, the, internet-
based platform Rousseau (Biorcio, 2015; Biorcio & Natale, 2013; I. Diamanti, 2014). 
Furthermore, both parties have in their manifestos a deep institutional reshuffle project. This 
article tackles the differences and the common points of the two main Italian populist groups. 
Lega
Northern League and Lega with Salvini
Given the Lega’s multiple, blurred, and confused cadres, statutes, and militancy, it is not an 
easy task to explain its structure at first. Although the Lega and the LN seem to be the same party, 
in fact, they are not. They certainly overlap in many aspects, such as having the same leader, Matteo 
Salvini. For a better understanding of what the Lega is nowadays, it is necessary to step back to 2013. 
That year was the crucial turning point for Italian politics, due to, on the one hand, the earthquake 
triggered by the M5S’s impressive results in the 2013 General Elections and the consequent populist 
renovation in all parties, including the LN. 
2 We use the term ‘party’ here following the definition by Sartori (2005, p. 56): “a party is any political group 
identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free), 
candidates for public office.”
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rhetorical ability, developed by means of decades of professional practice and a cynical use of the 
social media.
The leader and the audience
As stressed above, during his political career, Matteo Salvini has developed a strong and 
useful demagogic ability. The Lega’s leader has always run not along with, but besides the party 
and the institutions. His attendance in the European Parliament and in the Ministry of the Interior’s 
offices was very low, but his presence in the social media and on the streets is strong. Since he has 
been elected the party’s secretary, in 2013, he froze the middle layers of his party and run as a lonely 
man playing on 2 stages: a) on the street, i.e. with a direct link to the people; and b) by means of the 
social media (Bobba, 2017; G. Diamanti & Pregliasco, 2019). 
Luca Morisi, Professor of Philosophy and the Web at the School of Languages of the University 
of Verona, founder of the Sistema Intranet company, an internet communication provider, has been 
since 2013 one of the leading Salvini’s spin doctors (G. Diamanti & Pregliasco, 2019). It is worth 
stressing that like Jair Bolsonaro, in Brazil, and Donald Trump, in the United States of America 
(USA), Salvini has succeeded in a sort of miracle: he inherited a weak party and turned it into the 
top force in the country. After being appointed Minister of the Interior, his communication staff 
has consistently increased. Outside the Lega’s party structure and under Salvini’s tight control, a 
huge, expensive, and overarching social media structure named as ‘La Bestia’ was built (Forti, 2018). 
Andrea Paganella, co-founder of the Sistema Intranet company along with Luca Morisi, joined that 
staff and was appointed Head Secretary. 
Furthermore, just as in the cases of Trump and Bolsonaro, Salvini’s official media communication 
strategy is run along a fine line between fake and non-fake news. In other words, the message is built 
in such a way that it could easily lead to misinterpretation. Moreover, several Twitter and Facebook 
accounts not directly related to the so-called Captain, nickname given by the spin doctor to the 
leader in order to support Salvini’s policies. It is not by chance that Facebook has recently closed 23 
accounts. With more than 2 million followers, they were spreading fake news in favor of the Lega and 
the M5S and against immigration as a whole. 
To sum up, the Lega’s communication strategy has three primary layers. 
The first layer focuses on real life: streets, markets, actual events, and so on. That is where 
the content to be shared through social media is produced: selfies, the leader’s speech, crowds 
surrounding the leader, etc. 
The second layer consists in the official social networks: Twitter and Facebook. That is the real 
life where content is released and analyzed (followers can share, comment, and like it). It is a key 
source of information that can be used to reach more people and gain consensus. 
And, finally, the third layer is the ambiguous space of unofficial social networks. That is where 
messages regarded as unfeasible otherwise, given their controversial nature, can be released. Since 
there is no direct link, it is hard to prove that they are related to the official party’s body. However, 
The Lega’s leader
As the literature on the subject almost unanimously proposes (Laclau, 2005; Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2017; Urbinati, 2014), populist movements are strongly linked to their leader’s charismatic 
action and the Lega fits perfectly into that framework. As informed above, Matteo Salvini was elected 
the LN’s Federal Secretary through primary election on December, 7 2013. 
The LN is, or it was until 2013, the oldest party in the Italian parliament. The party’s historical 
leader, Umberto Bossi, took office for his first term as senator in the summer of 1987, not long before 
the outbreak of the Clean Hands Operation (the Mani Pulite Inquiry) to fight corruption, in March 
1992, and the consequent fall of the so-called First Republic, which lasted from 1946 to 1992. Since 
1994, the LN has ruled all the Northern Italy and it remained in government with Go Italy (Forza Italia 
[FI) for 9 years. 
However, in 2012, the so-called Carroccio was experiencing its deepest crisis since its official 
foundation as a party, in 1991 (Passarelli & Tuorto, 2018). In September 2012, the party was shaken 
by several corruption trials, and one of them directly affected its founder, Umberto Bossi, his inner 
circle, and Francesco Belsito, the party’s treasurer. Inevitably, there was a sharp drop in the party’s 
results in the 2013 elections. The LN won only 4% of the votes, i.e. only half of the votes won on the 
previous 2008 elections. Over this period, the LN’s leader was Roberto Maroni, former Minister of 
the Interior, from the party’s conservative wing. On September 23, 2013, the Lega’s federal council 
gathered to try overcoming the crisis, by calling an election for new leader on December 7 and also 
a party congress one week later. 
For the first time in Lega’s history, members were allowed to vote directly for their leader 
through primary elections5 . The contest was highly symbolic, since its founder, Umberto Bossi, was 
opposed by the young and charismatic Matteo Salvini. The poll results were ruthless: Bossi was 
heavily defeated (80% of thousands of votes chose the alleged outsider Salvini).
Although the primary assumption of Salvini’s official rhetoric is grounded in the idea of 
a newcomer not related to the LN’s corrupt political elite, in fact, i.e. completely and somehow 
paradoxically untrue. Indeed, Salvini has been a member of the LN since 1990, and he was a member 
of the Milan Council (from 1993 to 2006), a European Member of Parliament (MP) (from 2004 to 
2014), and ultimately an Italian MP. 
Furthermore, during his political career, Salvini has played many roles in propaganda. Firstly, 
he was a journalist for La Padania, the party’s newspaper, then for Radio Padania, where he worked 
as a director (from 1999 to 2013). For 20 years, Salvini has dealt with the media rather than played 
ruling roles at a national or regional level. Therefore, undoubtedly the Lega’s leader has strong 
media and communication skills. In fact, Salvini has become a prominent Italian leader thanks to his 
5 It is worth highlighting that the LN’s primary elections differ from those of the center-left wing PD. While only 
members are allowed to vote in the LN’s primary election, the PD has open voting.
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who “must not be appointed by parliament” and he should also be the “Head of State” (LpSP, 2018, 
p. 21, our translation). The Judicial Power’s independence is dramatically reduced, subjugated to 
politics in two main ways. 
Second, on the one hand, ‘judges must apply the law and not make it;’ on the other hand, 
constitutional judges must be elected by the Head of State (Executive Power), the parliament and 
the regional administrations. No role is assigned to the Judicial Power in order to choose judges for 
the Constitutional Court. 
And third, the profound change in the balance within the Parliamentary Power due to the 
Lega’s blueprint with regard to the 1946 Constitution has favored the Executive Power. However, this 
is not the only radical change in the way how the MPs work. The number of deputies and senators 
must be steadily reduced, as well as their independence: “a binding mandate must be introduced 
to avoid deputies changing the party membership during their mandate” (LpSP, 2018, p. 21, our 
translation). Last but not least, it is proposed to abolish ‘referenda’s minimum quorum to increase 
their effectiveness.’
Clearly, the people/community has become the primary source of any legitimation, it is more 
powerful than the rule of law. This is due to the referenda reform, with direct election for the Head of 
Government and the Head of State and the MPs and judges’ limited independence.
As pointed out by Norberto Bobbio (1990), democracy has grown within liberalism and, to a 
certain extent, in contradiction to liberalism. Democracy means the power of the people, liberalism 
means the limitation of power, also the power of the people; here, the rule of law prevails over 
legitimation. It seems that the Lega’s blueprint has some features of the presidential model, but with 
the crucial difference of not including its strong checks and balances.
The stolen sovereignty’s rhetoric has turned into a directly exerted and illiberal democracy, 
where the hidden, implicit, and inevitable outcome is, as explained by Nadia Urbinati (2014), 
plebiscitarianism. 
The four phases of the 5-star movement
So far, there are four main steps in the M5S’s evolution: a) the period prior to the movement’s 
creation (2005-2009), entirely focused on the comedian Beppe Grillo; b) the movement’s birth, in 
2009, up to the impressive victory at the 2013 General Elections; c) the party’s institutionalization 
and the rise of an established leadership, up to the end of the first Conte administration; and d) the 
new alliance with the center-left wing PD.
this third layer is useful to capture the audiences’ reaction to rather aggressive messages, fake news, 
and so on. These three levels are strongly interconnected. It is worth stressing that, although social 
networks play a key role in producing and spreading the Captain’s thought, most of his audience is 
outside the social networks.
The Lega’s institutional framework
The question that we are going to answer herein is twofold: a) what the institutional framework 
proposed by the Lega is; and b) to what extent it is consistent with the populist ideal type. 
The program proposed by Matteo Salvini, for the Italian legislative election held in March 2018, 
includes an extensive section on that subject. “Giving the people their sovereignty back” (LpSP, 
2018, p. 1, our translation), as stated by the Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, is certainly the 
cornerstone of the whole blueprint, which is moving forward to establish a true people’s democracy. 
As underlined by Ernesto Laclau (2005, p. 83), “populism requires the dichotomic division 
of society into two camps – one presenting itself as a part which claims to be the whole; that this 
dichotomy involves the antagonistic division of the social field” It is written in Lega’s program that 
“Democracy means rule of the people. Its main essence is people’s participation in the government” 
(LpSP, 2018, p. 20, our translation). Therefore, the question that has to be answered is: who has 
stolen the people’s sovereignty? First and foremost, the main thief is the European Union (EU), 
i.e. not Europe per se, but ‘the specific European model.’ Sovereignty and anti-Europeanism are 
among the main points bringing together all the continental populist parties. Second, “international 
institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organization (WTO)” (LpSP, 2018, 
p. 20, our translation). Third, “the powerful international sovereign funds and the thousands and 
thousands of dollars maneuvered by them and their capacity to influence the State policies” (LpSP, 
2018, p. 20, our translation). The typical victim’s logic in this kind of party is not unlike the fascists’ 
rationale soon after World War I6 . 
However, the enemies of the people do not come only from more or less unidentified foreign 
countries. The representative democracy’s bodies are also to blame for having stolen the people’s 
sovereignty; therefore, it is necessary to “develop the institutions of direct democracy to correct 
the distortion of representative democracy” (LpSP, 2018, p. 20, our translation). The Lega’s project 
should be encompassed by the larger family of anti-liberal thought. As a consequence, all mediations 
between démos and power, the checks and balances, must be broken down and move towards 
establishing a bottom-up direct legitimation. 
The main axis of the constitutional reforms proposed by the Lega manifesto revolves around 
the 3 branches of politics: a) Executive Power; b) Judicial Power; and c) Parliamentary Power.
First, according to the Lega’s project, balance within the institutional framework, based on 
parliament as a cornerstone, must change dramatically. The Executive Power should become the 
prevalent body in the hierarchy legitimated by the “direct election of a strong Head of the Executive” 
6  The victim’s rhetoric used to depict the mutilated victory after World War I was a major theme in fascist propaganda.
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granted by Grillo’s interventions to his people and against the oligarchy reached and compelled 
an increasingly trustful audience, willing to engage in an actual participation that goes beyond 
the narrow boundaries of the virtual world. In his blog, Grillo addresses the roots of a widespread 
activism throughout Italy, generally not linked to political parties, and to some extent distrustful of 
politics. He declares his will to use a megaphone in favor of those people and the complaints that 
nobody wants to hear. 
Therefore, along with the blog, an actual platform consisting of small groups of citizens has 
been established (Biorcio, 2015). Again, the internet is useful to the comedian and the tool chosen 
for this purpose is the MeetUp. The idea behind the MeetUp network is to provide support to local 
struggles by promoting a new kind of activism rigorously outside the older parties’ framework. 
Thanks to Grillo’s legitimation, thousands of individuals decided to engage in the struggles (Biorcio, 
2015). A real activist network springs out of the virtual world. One of the most important cases 
arising from the MeetUp in these years was the so-called ‘280,’ whose main aim was establishing a 
civic list for direct democracy (Murphy, n.d.).
A third tool of political participation, after the blog and the MeetUp, has consisted in big 
events/demonstrations. Halfway between a traditional demonstration and a rather traditional 
spectacle, Grillo reached an even larger group of people. The so-called ‘Fuck Off Day’ took place on 
September 8, 2007, in Bologna, with 30,000 participants. There were 200,000 people participating 
in the whole network and more than 200 meetings were held throughout Italy (Corriere della Sera, 
2007).
So, 300 signatures were gathered to support a referendum on the law against political 
professionalization and in favor of a rather direct democracy11 . At the Liberation anniversary 
celebration (April 25, 2008), a second V-Day was organized to promote a second wave of referenda, 
then to abolish public funding to political parties and to the media. The relationship between the 
media, public funding, oligarchy, and freedom seems to be one of the main M5S’s issues. More than 
1 million signatures were gathered, but the referendum was disregarded by the Constitutional Court. 
The rise of the 5-Star MoVement and the victory at the Italian 
general elections (2009-2013)
After four years of experience, on October 4, 2009, the M5S, the instrument used to compete 
on the electoral arena, was created. The people, as pointed out above, was already there as a direct 
link connecting the leader to his audience. It is worth highlighting that the three participation layers, 
i.e. internet activists, local activists, and demonstrators/spectators, are rather different from each 
other and even irreconcilable to some extent. 
Even rejecting the left/right axis, the M5S early roots were clearly connected to traditional 
left-wing’s themes and their political participation forms. Each of the movement’s stars represents 
11 The bill proposes parliamentarian ineligibility for those convicted of crimes with sentences exceeding 10 months, 
the limit of 2 legislatures for parliamentarians and the introduction of the vote in preference in the electoral law (Grillo, 2007).
Building the audience (2005-2009)
In January 2005, Grillo’s blog was opened. Along with the comedian, Gianroberto Casaleggio 
was one of the leading Italian characters concerning internet marketing strategies7 . Casaleggio is 
a sort of head providing Grillo, the charismatic claim maker, with the knowledge needed to deliver 
pervasive communication through social networks and Grillo is for Casaleggio the voice capable of 
spreading the latter’s messages – one of the most widely known is Casaleggio (n.d.). By far, this is 
the key cornerstone in the forthcoming M5S’s life (Adinolfi, 2016). The discourse and the way how it 
has been established play a central role in audience building. This marks the very beginning of the 
new comedian’s political experience: in just a few weeks, Grillo’s posts became a rather influential 
reference. In October, the Time magazine included him among the 2005 European Heroes (Israely, 
2005) and in December he was awarded the prize by the Italian economic newspaper il Sole 24 ore 
as the best news website. Four years later, in 2009, the Forbes magazine, which establishes each 
year a ranking of the most influent personalities on the web, placed Grillo’s blog in 7th position8 . 
In the beginning, the blog’s themes focused just on complaining about the so-called cast9 , i.e. the 
oligarchy in both political and economic terms. Indeed, the very first steps involved complaints 
against the big Italian companies, fraudulent bankruptcy procedures, and the consequent loss of 
stock values, especially among middle class investors10 .
It is worth noticing that, in 2008, the Italian radical left-wing coalesced into a sort of cartel 
named as Rainbow Left (Sinistra Arcobaleno), which did not reach the 4% cut off established 
by the electoral law to have a seat in the parliament. Electors blamed the Radical Left-Wing for 
its participation in Romano Prodi’s administration. As a consequence, a major non-mainstream 
opposition has suddenly disappeared and this opened room for a newcomer. Grillo’s blog emerged 
exactly at that moment in public opinion as a unique legitimate oppositional point of reference. It 
annihilated, on the one hand, the non-mainstream opposition and, on the other hand, all mainstream 
parties were put by the comedian at the same level. Relying on an effective pun, grounded in the 
acronyms of the two mainstream parties, Grillo showed that the only difference between them is just 
an ‘L,’ so the PD became a People of Freedom (Popolo delle Libertà [PDL]) without the ‘L.’ 
In other words, Beppe Grillo had a relatively long learning period that preceded his political 
experience, where he underwent a transformation from comedian to politician. Furthermore, soon 
his blog seemed to be something more than just a blog right from the beginning. The legitimation 
7 As reported by Roberto Biorcio and Paolo Natale (2013), the meeting between Beppe Grillo and Gianroberto 
Casaleggio is crucial to grasp the entire project’s evolution. Casaleggio has been one of the main Italian experts in developing 
web marketing strategies.
8         “His highly political material struck a chord with audiences, and Grillo became a force in Italian politics. In 2005, he 
started sharing his thoughts on a blog – it’s now available in Italian, English and Japanese, and is one of the most widely read 
in the world, making him a truly global Web Celeb” (Ewalt, 2009). 
9 Since 2007, cast has become a sort of synonym for the term oligarchy and it means an irremovable political elite.
10 Given its consequences on the middle class, the most paradigmatic case of fraudulent bankruptcy was certainly 
that of Parmalat. For more information, see La Repubblica (2004).
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its first step, until 2018, the whole citizen/movement relationship changed. The party has become 
rather vertical in the institutions instead of horizontal and local participation through the MeetUp 
has almost disappeared. 
In contrast to its principles, even for the M5S, politics became increasingly professionalized. 
After the large wave of deputies elected in 2013, from November 2014 on, a rather restricted core 
emerged within the party, the so-called directory, which consists of Alessandro di Battista and Luigi 
di Maio – the latter is now the party’s political chief.
The 5-Star institutional framework
Beyond the new political paradigm of self-representation, it is not easy to see which are the 
main features of the M5S, and the same applies to grasping how they evolved over time. The 5 main 
values, i.e. the 5 stars (environment, water, energy, development, and transport) lose their relevance 
step by step. Active participation through the MeetUp structure almost disappeared. From 2013 on, 
just one way to participate in it was left: direct vote through Grillo’s blog. However, the alleged post-
ideological flexibilities, the rejection of left-right axes, are political attitudes per se to seek the widest 
political support. Nonetheless, there are 3 main ideas: a) direct democracy (as a way to overcome 
the overwhelming oligarchy’s power); b) environment; and c) minimum monthly wage. 
The main idea of the M5S is to radically change the way how liberal and representative 
democracy works. At that level, it takes an overt ultra-democratic but anti-liberal connotation. 
Therefore, the relationship between démos and power should not be mediated by intermediate 
bodies. The web is the main instrument, the engine that made parties, trade unions, and reliable 
information sources obsolete (Casaleggio & Grillo, 2011), providing new ways to link démos to power. 
Given its choice for anti-professionalized politics, by following the principles of direct democracy, the 
M5S’s candidate selection has always taken place through an internet voting named as Parlamentarie 
(Linkiesta, 2012)13 .
The M5S aims to foster an “efficient change of opinion and democratic confrontation outside 
associative or party link, outside mediation representative bodies” (M5S, 2009, Article 4, our 
translation). Also, membership is far from being similar to traditional rules. In the beginning, to 
become member, and thus vote through the internet, being registered and accepting the rules 
is enough. Membership is open to all citizens who do not belong to political parties (M5S, 2009, 
Article 5).
The main enemy consists in intermediate bodies, which stole people’s sovereignty: “political 
parties have replaced the popular will and removed people’s power of judgment” (M5S, 2018). 
According to the M5S’s program, it is necessary to strengthen those instruments, allowing citizens 
to participate directly. Just as in the case of party, the idea of representation is also rejected by the 
‘non-statute.’ Representatives are no longer representatives, but spokesmen for M5S’s members and 
13  It is worth underlining that, just as in the case of the M5S, the PD, even through different rules, has also adopted 
in 2012 a primary election to select the candidate to the General Election.
one of its main values: a) Environment; b) Water; c) Energy; d) Development; and e) Transport. 
However, on the other hand, language, mainly addressing internet participation, is blurrer. The letter 
‘V’ in the noun ‘MoVement’ must be capitalized, because it recalls, at the same time, the V-Day, as a 
metaphor for the Normandy landing, the Fuck the cast (Vaffa), and Vengeance (MoVimento 5 Stelle 
[M5S], 2009). 
Thus, as it happened previously for the MeetUp, the M5S emerges as a sort of franchiser 
whose aim is providing local groups with support to fight by sharing the Statute’s values12 . It is 
worth stressing that the years 2008-2013 were characterized by a huge wave of scandals that hit 
both businesses and politics. Moreover, the M5S’s rise has happened along with the outbreak of the 
economic crisis. In such a contest, to bring several months of speculation against the Italian public 
debt to an end, as well as to avoid the Italian bankruptcy, in November 2011, Silvio Berlusconi’s 
administration was replaced by Mario Monti’s administration. Although the cabinet consisted 
almost entirely of university professors, parliamentarian support came from the 2 mainstream party 
aisles: a) center-left wing; and b) center-right wing. The PD and the PDL coalesced into the same 
administration. As a consequence, public opinion blamed both mainstream parties for the outcomes 
of the sharp cut in public expenditure and the rise of imposition. This framework paved the way 
for the first MoVement’s successful local elections, in 2012. In Parma, a mid-sized municipality in 
Northern Italy, Federico Pizzarotti was elected Mayor and in the Sicilian regional elections the M5S 
was the most successful party. Over the technical Monti’s administration, the party system was under 
siege and sharply delegitimized. In February 2013, new general elections were scheduled and public 
opinion saw clearly who was accountable and who was not. There were 2 major themes in the 
electoral contest: a) Monti’s austerity policies; and b) the scandals related to Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena’s bankruptcy, regarded by many people as a bank close to the PD. In such a scenario, it is easy 
for an anti-system party to obtain consent. The 2013 general elections’ results were impressive: the 
M5S was the first party (with 25 56%), and it was only due to a biased electoral law favoring party 
coalitions that it did not secure a larger majority: 109 out of the 630 deputies and 54 out of the 315 
senators. Therefore. Grillo’s decision to participate in the electoral game may seem inconsistent; the 
leader’s aim is conquering the institutions from within and opening the parliament like a tin of tuna 
(Grillo, 2013), changing the very practical rationale of political representation. The brand ‘party’ is 
explicitly rejected by its statute (M5S, 2009, Article 4), or, better said, by its non-statute. No physical 
seat and headquarters are allowed, the only one accepted by the non-statute is the website www.
movimento5stelle.it (M5S, 2009, Article 1).
From the 2013 Italian political election on, the M5S became a stable player, 1 of the 3 wings 
in the parliament: a) center left; b) center right; and c) M5S. Since 2005, when Grillo’s blog took 
12  “If we look at the initial phase of the M5s, we find ourselves before a political force that has its origins in the humus 
of the movements and parties of the libertarian and radical left. This is the silent revolution, characterized by the struggle for 
the affirmation of transversal, post-ideological and post-materialist values such as civil rights and equal opportunities, peace, 
solidarity, development and ecology” (Corbetta & Gualmini, 2013, p. 34).
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Within the institutions, people have to take an actual position and, after a bargaining process 
that caused many doubts, from 2014 to 2019 the M5S entered the group “Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy” along with right-wing, anti-immigration, and Euro-skeptical populist parties such 
as the “UK Independence Party” (UKIP), the German “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD), and the 
“Swedish Democrats”19 . 
Surprisingly, after the 2019 European elections, the M5S’s strategy made a U-turn on its anti-
European stances. Though the M5S was by far the main party in the governmental alliance with 
the Lega, it soon became the leading Executive character. As a consequence, the results of 2019 
European elections, held in May, were catastrophic for Luigi Di Maio. In just a few months, the M5S 
dropped from 32% to 17%. 
The huge M5S’s defeat marks the beginning of a rather pro-European stance. In July 2019, 
the Lega and the M5S took opposite positions towards the election of the new President of the 
European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. The first voted against, just as the other sovereignty 
parties while, surprisingly, the M5S voted for. 
Conclusions
In the beginning of August 2019, Matteo Salvini, the Minister of the Interior, and the vice-
president of the cabinet decided to bring to parliament a vote of no confidence over Conti’s 
administration, bringing the populist cabinet formed in alliance with the M5S to an end. The Lega’s 
leader aimed to compel the Head of State to call new elections. The primary assumption of the 
Captain was that no other governmental majorities were found, thus elections were the only way 
out. However, unexpectedly, the M5S reached an agreement with the center-left wing PD and paved 
the way for a second government led by Conte. To a certain extent, that was a sort of powerlessness 
statement: populist decision-making processes have not been working. It is the second time in 
recent Italian history that attempts to overcome traditional decision-making patterns were defeated. 
The first was in 1994-1995, when Silvio Berlusconi tried to achieve his liberal revolution, but after 1 
year, he was defeated and obliged to resign. Antagonistic legitimacy is one of the main promises of 
populist parties, but consensus democracy, i.e. a widespread mediation between several players, has 
been the rule so far (Lijphart, 2012).
It is certainly too soon to grasp which are the implications and what exactly means such a 
U-turn of the Yellow Movement. It is very unlikely that Grillini’s leadership gets rid of the populist 
ideology and the direct democracy tools, taking a rather classic liberal/representative democratic 
approach. Indeed, it is worth highlighting that the final seal of that alliance has been put by the M5S 
19 “Committed to the principles of democracy, freedom and co-operation among Nation States, the Group favors 
an open, transparent, democratic and accountable co-operation among sovereign European States and rejects the 
bureaucratization of Europe and the creation of a single centralized European super State” (Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy [EFDD], n.d.).
any decision has to be taken through web conversations with members. The M5S’s idea is that to 
avoid betraying people’s will, a binding mandate for deputies should be introduced. Closed primary 
elections, i.e. open only to members registered on a website, such as in the case of Parlamentarie, 
for a given period is the way how candidates are selected14 . Repeated waves of public judgment 
concerning the MP’s activities are promoted on Grillo’s blog and several deputies are expelled under 
the blame of failing to observe the movements’ rules. 
On the grounds of direct participation, all horizontal tools for exchange between militants are 
virtually banned. To promote direct and almost vertical participation, in 2016 a new internet platform 
called Rousseau has been created15 . According to Gianroberto Casaleggio, the movement’s main 
tool and operating system, and a sort of ‘collective intelligence’16 , as well as a means to achieve the 
main goal of the movement: direct or, in other words, plebiscitarian democracy.
From the European elections (2014) to the populist government 
(August 2019) 
European elections are another turning point in the M5S’s stabilization process. In the 
manifesto optimistically entitled “Us We Won” (Modigliani, 2014), Casaleggio and Grillo did not 
clarify the movement’s ultimate position. Seemingly, the M5S is not entirely anti-EU, and it is also 
not necessarily against a federal framework, as long as each ‘nation’17  joins voluntarily18 . The stances 
towards the treaties that had been put into practice over the years around the Euro Zone are clearer. 
On that dimension, the M5S proposed to overcome the whole pact regarding austerity policies and 
budget deficit cuts. However, things are less clear about the Euro-currency market. On the one hand, 
it is written that M5S’s members do have to decide, through a referendum (Modigliani, 2014); on 
the other hand, it may be useful to establish different Euro Areas: one for northern and another for 
southern countries (Modigliani, 2014). The ballot boxes were not rewarding in this case, since the 
movement won only 21%, less than in the national elections. The PD’s strategy, i.e. focusing on fear 
of leaving Euro Zone, won 40%. 
14 Paradoxically, for a party that takes membership as its point of reference, the scarce participation, about 95,000 
voters, shows the contradiction of an ideology aiming to take bottom-up mobilization as its rule.
15 “Its main goals are handling in several elective components (Italian and European Parliament, regional and local 
councils) membership participation” (MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2016, our translation).
16 Nicola Morra, former president of the M5S’s senators group, defines the new platform this way: “Rousseau is a 
challenge, a challenge that we could win and that we want to win. Rousseau is the collective intelligence that became little by 
little a reality” (MoVimento 5 Stelle, 2016, our translation).
17  Throughout the program, the term nation is repeated over and over. In this context, it suggests certain common 
views with the right-wing’s cultural world through which the M5S established a single parliamentary group in Europe and 
some doubts about the actual and undeniable European inspiration are suggested (Modigliani, 2014).
18 Behind the concept of nation proposed by Casaleggio and Grillo, we may find, although with tones that are not 
exacerbated, yet, a child of globalization. In other words, that identity-based nationalism derived from commonality of values 
and defense of the ‘people’ against the ‘elites’ (Taguieff, 2012).
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First, the audience may be split into 2 further different aspects: a) charismatic leadership; and 
b) discourse. Charismatic leadership stands as a cornerstone in both cases. Salvini and Grillo had an 
impressive ability to draw the attention of a large community and to constitute a reliable platform 
for their representative claims. Both of them had a media background, the latter as a comedian, the 
former as a professional politician specialized in marketing and propaganda. 
Second, they both used social media as an echo chamber for their claims and as a way 
to reach a huge audience directly. However, they differ on the way that link is established. Grillo 
proposed himself as a person not interested in overlapping political roles. His blog is a sort of 
franchiser of bottom-up political positions, providing people’s voice with a greater impact. Salvini 
is the uncorrupted politician that swept the corrupted elite from his party, the LN, and the political 
scenario. His voice is not spread by a blog, but through markets, roads, and police stations, which 
can establish connections and give rise to compelling ideological narratives (Ballacci, 2019).
Undoubtedly, the parties adopted two different strategies, but in both cases the social networks 
played a crucial role: behind a seemingly naïf communication, there was a highly professionalized 
structure. 
But populism is not just a discourse, it is a complex political framework based on a discourse 
and an institutional arrangement that allows a less mediated representation. On that layer, we see 
that the Lega and the M5S have two different projects, but they share a common idea: people have 
to participate more directly in the decision-making process. How to reach that goal? The M5S’s 
answer to this question is through digital democracy. The Lega had a rather traditional project based 
on 3 main reforms: a) direct election of the Head of Government; b) majority electoral law; and 
c) more powerful referenda. Actually, strengthening the referendum as a tool, getting rid of the 
minimum cut-off, and turning politics into a kind of daily plebiscite (Renan, 2013) is the main claim of 
these parties. Both political projects are based on the prevalence of people’s legitimacy over rule of 
law (Schmitt, 2004), which is at the root of the diarchic system of representative democracy, where 
people’s legitimacy and rule of law overlap each other (Urbinati, 2014).
through internet voting on the platform Rousseau. That is, people’s legitimacy prevailed over the 
rule of law again (Schmitt, 2004).
The long relationship between populism and the Italian political system had a major change 
in 1992. From the Clean Hands Operation on, the claim for a sharp renovation of the constitutional 
framework towards a less mediated paradigm has been strong and consistent (Mastropaolo, 2000). 
For a better understanding of the Italian road to populism, we should not focus on single parties and 
their claims, but on the way how the broad system has worked since the anti-corruption revolutionary 
processes began, in the 1990s. During that revolution, widely supported by public opinion and mass 
media, all the main populist themes were already there: a) corrupted elite; b) country decline; c) 
unfit political class; d) political system that does not allow the people to make decisions, etc. 
The first step towards a huge renovation process in the party system was the electoral 
reform. The goal of the 1993 referendum held was to get rid of the electoral proportional system 
and introduce a majority system. The main aim was to allow the people to vote for the Head of 
Government in a rather direct way, thus reducing party power. Since then, there has been continued 
tension between representative democracy and direct democracy, in which the former has always 
won. Waves of referenda have been used to overcome oligarchy’s resistance to political system 
reforms. The mediatization of the Italian politics has Silvio Berlusconi as its main character, but he 
was just the tip of a larger iceberg. Political parties seeking a sort of modernization and trying to 
escape the 20th century framework demobilize the two main mass-party apparatus: a) ideology; 
and b) membership. The way they found to seek legitimation was direct election of their leaders. 
Leadership became the main focus and the ultimate legitimation source in an increasingly fluid 
political game.
Several rounds of constitutional reforms have been put in place, but a large part of them were 
rejected, all of them focusing on a central theme: giving back decision-making power to the people. 
As explained by Alfio Mastropaolo (2000), anti-politics has been the Italian zeitgeist for thirty 
years, thus to better understand the second wave of populist parties that started in 2013, we must 
encompass the first one and the LN has never left its populist roots when holding power (Albertazzi 
& McDonnell, 2015). So far, and somewhat paradoxically, the increasing competitiveness between 
leaders has been the main cause of the populist defeat. This is the context where the victory of 
even more explicit populist groups, such as the Lega and the M5S, must be framed. The evolution of 
Italian politics needs to be analyzed by considering the representative and liberal democracy crisis 
that emerged in 1992. Furthermore, as explained by Norberto Bobbio (1990), there is a contradiction 
between democracy, which must be legitimated by the démos, and liberalism, where legitimation is 
derived from the rule of law. At that level, the Lega and the M5S represent a qualitative step forward 
on at least 2 aspects: a) a comprehensive definition of people; and b) an anti-liberal form of people’s 
representation. Therefore, there were 2 main layers on which we analyzed the M5S and the Lega: 
a) how they built their audience; and b) which are the institutions proposed by them to overcome 
liberal democracy and establish a rather direct link to the people. 
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